by Jon Roberts, TIP Strategies

No topic is of more immediate, more urgent concern than America’s job situation. The unemployment rate remains stubbornly high, the op ed pages overflow with prescriptions, warnings, and admonitions, entire communities are at financial and social risk. Among all these issues, there is a deeper discussion to be had. It goes something like this: what is a job – really – and how does it fit into the larger historical framework?

Before we tackle this question, there are a few related problems worth exploring. Whose job is it to create jobs? Well, not the public sector. At least we know that from the current giddy assault on government employment. Yes, cities, states, and federal agencies hire people but we are right to be suspicious of their contribution to the economy. They are doing work that we are paying ourselves to do. Or so the argument goes. They are like paying your own kids to mow the neighbor’s lawn. Your neighbor may like it (let’s assume he does), but your family is earning no additional income. It’s not a sustainable business model.

There’s more to be said on that topic, but let’s leave it at that. Then if not the public sector, who else? The private sector? Really? In what sense is it a reasonable expectation that the “private sector” should add employees? No private business exists in order to create jobs. It really is that simple. Businesses add employees when they have to add employees. Not before, and for no longer than they are needed. Any other attitude would result in . . . (you guessed it) an unsustainable business model.

But certainly there’s more to it than that. In a healthy economy jobs are created. It is in the interest of businesses to add employees. But this “interest” is self-interest, it is not for the good of economy as such. That can’t be a business concern. Which leads us to an interesting question: Can we have a healthy economy that isn’t producing jobs? Those who want jobs to be created, for whom it is a bit of crusade (the public sector) are powerless to do so directly. Those who could create jobs (the private sector) put themselves at substantial risk by adding workers when it compromises their competitiveness – thus making their model unsustainable. We are looking at a huge disconnect.

All these thorny questions and we haven’t even come to the really difficult one yet (what, after all, is a job?). Suffice it to say that if we ask whose job it is to create jobs, there is no easy answer – or perhaps no answer at all. We need to be asking a different question. Something like this: what are the conditions under which jobs will be created (by the private sector, of course). Are the answers easier to come by? Let’s try. Jobs get created when two things happen: there is a steady demand for product and services, and new workers are required to fulfill that demand. So what are the conditions under which this occurs? Consumers are confident and have the income (or credit) to act on their desires. And workers are able to increase the productivity of the company. Not just one of these things needs to happen. Both do. If I can increase my productivity (i.e., satisfy the demand for goods efficiently) without adding workers, I have no economic motivation to do so.

Before we leave this topic, we need to see the paradox this represents. If the only way I can sell my goods and services is to have customers able to do so, but the only way I can stay competitive is to reduce my labor costs, then who will there be to buy what I have to sell? As paradoxes go, this one is a doozy. Against this background we’re ready to ask our question:
What is a job?

Some historical context is relevant here. The concept of a job is not something we should take for granted. By that I mean people working directly for a company (an employer) who provides wages for specific activities. In fact, it’s a relatively recent development. Industry as we know it – and the structures that support industry – are a recent historical phenomenon. Prior to the 17th century, a merchant class was something of a novelty. There were farmers, to be sure, and craftsmen. Farmers typically worked for themselves, or they were indentured, but no one gave them a paycheck. Craftsmen did not go to a job in a factory and punch a clock. People did jobs, but they didn’t have a job. Even the rise of the merchant class did not immediately usher in an employer-employee structure, at least not in the corporate sense.
So you know what comes next (what always comes next in economic history). You guessed it. The Industrial Age. The 19th century changed everything. The idea of a workforce preceded the idea of a job. To put this somewhat differently, we were creating an economy that required specialized skills. Highly specialized skills – the ability to do one thing very, very well. This economy resulted in corporations, something that also had never existed before. The idea of a workforce had an almost transformative effect. If you weren’t “working for” a company, you weren’t working at all. Freelancers, housewives, apprentices – these all existed largely outside of the idea of the workforce.

Now all this is grossly over-simplified, but not entirely without basis, and certainly not without a point.
The point is that the notion of a job is not a fixed idea. It can change, it has changed, and it will (we think) change again. To explore this idea is to engage in a thought experiment. It is to imagine a growing cadre of highly talented individuals who fit their skills to the specific needs of corporations. They see that corporations have less and less need for things that machines can do. To put this more provocatively, the industrial age is over, and the machines have won (“I, for one, welcome our robot overlords,” to paraphrase from the Simpsons.). An economic model that seeks to create jobs by ignoring this reality is a failed model.

If we begin from that premise, entirely different models open up to the imagination. A flexible talent pool that moves to solve problems. A new cooperative corporate model in which consumers are themselves marketers, testers, and shareholders. Social innovators who build networks of services and products that operate first in a closed, then an open system. – Can we imagine any of this? Yes, because it is already happening. Social networking is redefining traditional sales models. “Professional services” are reconsidering where their value lies as search functions redefine legal analysis and insurance claims.

Simply put, there is no sector of the U.S. economy that is not fundamentally altering its business models. In this series of radical changes, why would we expect to solve the jobs question (i.e., to reduce unemployment) by expecting companies to hire people into permanent full-time jobs? This conception of “jobs” fits a model that simply doesn’t conform to business realities. And, for that matter, it doesn’t conform to the needs of the would-be worker.

None of this is simple. None of this will happen in a predictable way. None of this will be painless. But the changes have already begun. It works as a thought experiment not only because we can imagine it, but because we sense its inevitability.

The future of jobs is that they have no future. Passive job seekers desperately hoping to find job postings that fit their skills is the sad and painful dead end of an economic system that has run its course.

To say that the transition will be hard is more than an understatement. In fact, it will be as wrenching as the shift away from an agrarian economy was. Entire industries will cease to exist, communities will be in turmoil, families will suffer terrible indignities.

We could, perhaps, have eased the blow of this transition, but that opportunity has passed (if it ever was an option). Just as in the private sector, more efficient government is more efficient because it can do more with less. And in these times, that means fewer people. And fewer people employed (regardless of which sector) means higher unemployment.

This is not an economic forecast. Employment in the traditional sense will continue to go up and down. But the pattern, the move away from a 20th century employment model, is inevitable. Anything else is… unsustainable.



Jon will be presenting on this theme as an IGNITE presentation at IEDC’s 2012 Leadership Summit, January 29-31 in San Antonio, TX.

via The Wall Street Journal

By Conor Dougherty

AUSTIN, Texas—As the nation grapples with stubbornly high unemployment, Texas’s political and high-tech capital shows one way to create good jobs for people who didn’t go to college: Attract highly skilled entrepreneurs, and watch the companies they start hire lower-skilled workers.

Praxis Strategy Group, an economic-development consultancy, estimates Austin added 50,000 “middle-skill” positions in the past decade. These are jobs that require a two-year associate’s degree or the equivalent work experience, and pay a median wage of $17.30 an hour, or $38,000 a year. That pace of growth is roughly four times faster than the nation’s as a whole, three times that of New York and Portland, Ore., and twice that of Phoenix.

Austin’s success in creating middle-class jobs runs against the grain of national trends. As America’s shift from manufacturing to the service sector has accelerated, economists have noted a hollowing out of such jobs.

In recent decades, a select number of brain hubs like Austin have attracted a higher percentage of well-educated workers and a lopsided share of new investment and young companies. In 1970, the top 10 most-educated metropolitan areas among the nation’s 100 largest had an average of 23% of workers holding a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared with 10% in the bottom 10, according to an analysis of Census data by Harvard University economist Edward Glaeser. The 13-percentage-point gap has widened every decade since, and had doubled by 2010.



Click on the interactive graphic to see the growth in middle-skill jobs from 2001 in Austin and other regions.

Beyond creating new middle-skill jobs, such brain hubs have generally higher incomes and for the most part have performed better through the recession. In Austin, the 7.1% average unemployment rate in 2010 was well below the nation’s during the same period.

Of course, Austin also has a fast-growing population, which helps create jobs in any economic environment. And it’s not as if other cities can create a more-educated populace overnight.

Still, Austin’s success in creating middle-level jobs shows how a well-educated work force can raise the fortunes of lesser-educated workers as well. Raleigh, N.C., has benefited from the same dynamic.

One consequence of the economy’s shift away from production toward brain work is that companies are constantly seeking new ways to break down high-value intellectual tasks into smaller, cheaper bits. Much the same way that assembly lines created millions of new jobs by reducing mass production to a sum of tasks, employers in Austin and elsewhere are constantly breaking down higher-skill jobs to “create new middle-skill, middle-income specialties,” according to a recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute.

Take Homeaway Inc., a vacation-rental service founded here in 2005 that went public this year. Its rapid growth allows entry-level employees to substantially raise their income, said Brent Bellm, the company’s chief operating officer.

Mr. Bellm points to customer-service representatives, who earn from $25,000 to the low-$30,000s range and field phone calls and e-mails from people using the company’s website. About one-third of them are promoted annually to areas such as a security team that monitors the site for fraudulent listings and removes shoddy properties. “In a few years, you can go from the high 20s to the 50s,” he said.

Simply put, rapid growth boosts the value even of workers who have a limited education but possess knowledge of a company’s systems.

Enrico Moretti, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, notes that highly educated cities see faster wage growth for less-educated citizens as well as the high fliers. One reason is that that many lower-level employees use the most productive technologies and act as complements to more-expensive and highly-educated workers, making it much easier for companies to raise their wages faster than overall inflation.

Another force, Mr. Moretti notes, is called “human capital spillovers,” a fancy way of saying that many “middle skill” workers begin to acquire skills that are much more valuable than their overall education level might suggest.

That’s how Douglas Kanneman went from a bored retail clerk feeling grim about his prospects to a computer-equipment technician with a four-bedroom house and the chance to let his wife work part-time while looking after their two children.

Mr. Kanneman, 37 years old, began his working life like a lot of people who didn’t go to college—at a retail store with low pay. Looking to better his prospects at 25, he went to community college for computer training and eventually landed a customer-service job at SolarWinds in Tulsa, Okla., which makes software that controls companies’ information infrastructure like computers and phone systems.

Later, when SolarWinds moved to the tech hub of Austin, Mr. Kanneman went with it. As the company grew, he worked his way into the better-paying information-technology department. A year ago, he did something that he said validated the worth of his new skills: He quit for a higher-paying job elsewhere in Austin, and with overtime can now earn more than $90,000 a year.

“It proved that I was worth as much as I thought I was,” Mr. Kanneman said.

Write to Conor Dougherty at conor.dougherty@wsj.com

via Harvard Business Review

by Thomas Duesterberg

In what now seems a distant past, company research facilities like Xerox PARC and Bell Labs fueled innovation and growth for dominant American manufacturing firms. As the pace of technological change has quickened and the costs of R&D have grown, that model has ceased to work. Meanwhile, global competition has intensified the imperative to innovate; even long-standing manufacturing companies, such as Parker Hannifin, Timken, Kennametal, and United Technologies, strive to have 20% or more of their products be new or substantially revamped each year. Although many companies still maintain proprietary research operations (Google X lab, for example), they’re increasingly turning outward and depending on distributed or open research, in which firms or clusters of firms tap into larger networks of academic and applied work to drive new product and process development.

Of course, no single model of distributed R&D works for all companies. Large firms like Proctor & Gamble can push R&D and product innovation out through their supplier networks. P&G maintains a goal of 50% of its total innovation from outside the company, and half of that from outside suppliers. As Henry Chesbrough has argued, such a model requires rethinking internal organization as well as effectively working with the broader research community. Japanese automakers have long relied on their suppliers as innovation partners. U.S. automakers too have pushed product and process improvement out through their supply chain via the relentless drive to achieve 3% cost reduction year after year and still build competitive new models. Large firms can also buy smaller ones to acquire new technology.

Smaller companies in the manufacturing sector, competing in a global environment for increasingly sophisticated products, often don’t possess the financial strength or the in-house technical expertise to take advantage of the available science and engineering resources that can help them innovate and grow. New types of local and regional consortia or clusters are popping up in response to this problem, sometimes facilitated by public-private partnerships. An interesting example, just getting under way, is the Midwest Project for SME-OEM Use of Modeling and Simulation–a consortium of large OEMs like General Electric, Proctor & Gamble, and Deere; the State of Ohio; and several projects funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), including the Center for Manufacturing Services, the Ohio Super-Computer Center, and the Network for Computational Nanotechnology (NCN). NCN serves as a virtual laboratory through online simulation and education. It develops models and simulation tools to predict behavior at the device, circuit and system levels for nanoelectronics, nanomechanics, and nanobio systems. It serves over 180,000 users and mounts over 10,000 simulations a year, and also provides access to supercomputers to its users as needed.

The idea behind the Manufacturing HUB, a NSF-funded initiative at Purdue and a key part of the Midwest Project, is similar to the NCN but more explicitly designed to aid small and medium manufacturers (SMEs) in getting access to models, computing power, and technical expertise to aid their product and process innovation. The models and computational resources will give SMEs access to the resources needed to solve advanced problems in areas like fluid flow, structural behavior, and material strength which are crucial to building advanced products and processes.

The common thread of these developments is building and accessing larger networks — beyond the single firm or even clusters of small firms — to create the new products and processes needed to compete in a global manufacturing market. Many questions about these models remain to be solved with actual experience — systems integration, disconnect between R&D and production, intellectual property rights issues, tragedy of the commons, leaking competitive advantage — but the trends are well embedded at this point.

What are you seeing in your business or research that can point to the strengths and weaknesses of these models?

THOMAS DUESTERBERG

Thomas Duesterberg is the executive director of the Program on Manufacturing and Society in the 21st Century at The Aspen Institute.

via American Human Development Project


Click here to explore a set of interactive maps with data from 2008-2011. In the map above, I selected “High School Freshmen not Graduating after 4 Years” from the “dashboard of risks” menu, for all states, all ethnic groups, and the most recent data set. You can also view data by top 10 metropolitan areas, congressional districts, and so on.

Whites in Washington, DC, live, on average, twelve years longer than African Americans in the same city.

In the 2007–9 Great Recession, college graduates faced an un- and underemployment rate of 1 in 10; the rate for high school dropouts was greater than 1 in 3.

In no U.S. states do African Americans, Latinos, or Native Americans earn more than Asian Americans or whites.

These startling facts are just some of the issues covered in The Measure of America 2010-2011. With a foreword by Jeffrey D. Sachs, the second volume in The Measure of America series is an easy-to-understand guide to where different groups stand today, and why. The book contains American Human Development Index ranking for all 50 states, 435 congressional districts, major metropolitan areas, racial and ethnic groups, as well as men and women. It concludes with a set of recommendations for priority actions required to improve scores on the Index across the board and to close the stark gaps that separate groups.

The Measure of America 2010-2011 also shines a spotlight on risks to progress and opportunity, and identifies tested approaches to fostering resilience among different groups: Who is most at risk for obesity? How can workers secure better footholds in the job market? How important is early childhood education? This report provides the tools necessary to build upon past policy successes, protect the progress made over the last half century from emerging risks, and develop an infrastructure of opportunity that can serve a new generation of Americans.

Check out this interactive graphic by the Wall Street Journal that tracks unemployment since 1948. (It’s almost as exciting as our geography of jobs!

The Geography of Jobs data visualization we first created in the spring of 2008 has been updated through November 2011. The animated map shows the net change in jobs over a rolling 12-month period in the top 100 metropolitan areas (by population). In layman’s terms, the size of the bubbles on the map represent the net change in jobs from April ’09 to April ’10 (for example), and so on.

About the Map
This animated map provides a striking visual of employment trends over the last business cycle using net change in jobs from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics on a rolling 12-month basis. The animation highlights a number of concurrent trends leading up to the Great Recession, as well as evidence of a recovery.

The Dot-Com Bust & Recovery
The timeline begins in 2004 as the national economy recovered from the bursting of the dot-com bubble. At first, broad economic growth was apparent across most of the country. Two notable exceptions are the Bay Area — the hub of the tech boom that drove job growth during the prior decade — and several metropolitan areas within the Midwest. The map reveals that much of the industrial Midwest never fully recovered: manufacturers shed jobs while other parts of the country were adding them.

The Housing Bubble & Hurricane Katrina
The nation’s appetite for new homes is also evident. During the middle of the decade, job growth related to construction and real-estate occurred in Sun Belt states, such as California, Florida, Georgia, and Arizona. The map also captures dramatic job losses in New Orleans in 2005 as a result of Hurricane Katrina, as well as the city’s slow recovery driven largely by construction-related employment.

The Downturn Begins
By 2007, regional evidence of the coming economic downturn began to appear. Employment growth in California and Florida waned, with actual losses becoming evident in Los Angeles and Tampa. Layoffs also accelerated in the nation’s manufacturing heartland. By the first quarter of 2008, job losses in the Southeast and Midwest spread, setting off a chain of losses in neighboring areas. The same pattern was seen on the West Coast, with the epicenter in Los Angeles marching eastward to the Front Range of the Rockies.

Manhattan is an Island. Or is it?
As much of the nation was showing clear signs of entering a recession, New York City continued to boom as the flow of easy credit stimulated employment growth in the nation’s financial center. In late spring 2007, however, the financial bubble burst and New York experienced severe losses. Texas benefited from the run-up in oil prices through the middle of 2008, but began to recede by January 2009 as the energy and construction sectors weakened.

The Great Recession
Through early and mid-2009, job losses intensified across the country with layoffs peaking in August. At that time, the nation’s largest metropolitan areas New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago had also shed the greatest number of jobs from the previous year. For example, the Los Angeles metropolitan area had seen a net decrease in employment of 426,000. None of the top 100 MSAs had been immune to mass layoffs. The map shows that the bleeding had begun to stop in the fall of 2009.

A Reticent Recovery
In early 2010, the first signs of over-the-year job expansions emerged along the Texas-Mexico border and in Central Texas. By May, gains were seen along the I-95 corridor in D.C., New York, and Boston, and momentum spilled over the Appalachians into the nation’s industrial heartland in June. Net increases also appeared in San Jose and San Diego that summer. Most of the nation’s major metro areas were enjoying net job gains for the first time since before the recession that fall.

As of January 2011, only a few metros, including Atlanta, Memphis, Las Vegas, Sacramento, and Albany were still experiencing net job losses. Notably, many of the remaining red bubbles are in state capitals where budget shortfalls are having a negative impact on their recovery.

Are We There Yet?
While it is encouraging to have visual evidence of our national economic recovery, this does not indicate that all jobs lost during the course of the recession have been regained. Nor does it mean that all those seeking employment can get a job. In the chart below, we see that the total number of unemployed workers remains near a record high as more than 13 million Americans are seeking work.

Chart: Total unemployed in the US (in millions), seasonally adjusted

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Current Population Survey)

The bad news: six million more people are seeking jobs than at the start of the recession.